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1 Introduction
Why some societies are able to solve their collective action problems and others
are not? Why societies choose the particular institutions they choose from a vast
array of possible choices? In this article I provide a framework in which to formalize
the seminal work of Elinor Ostrom on the study of public economies, a prominent
theoretical construct aimed to provide answers to those important questions.
A public economy simply dened is a form of economic organization dedicated
to the production, provision and consumption of collective goods. In several studies
Ostrom and her co-authors have developed a set of hypotheses regarding the process
by which public economies have evolved to provide and produce public goods and
maintain common pool resources throughout the world. This process, according to
Ostrom, cannot be summarized by simply arguing that the marketis the resulting
solution to all the situations in which one can internalize at the individual level the
(external) e¤ects of the collective action problem at hand and that the state is
the resulting solution to all problems in which this is not the case. Instead, Os-
trom argues, the real world exhibits a variety of institutions, all of them imperfect
in nature, by which those collective action problems are routinely solved. These in-
clude families and clans, neighborhood associations, communal organizations, trade
associations, buyers and producers cooperatives, local voluntary associations and
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clubs, special districts, international regimes, public service industries, arbitration
and mediation associations, and charitable organizations,[12, p.36] among others.
Public economies are neither markets nor hierarchies and, according to Ostrom,
they are not very well understood. It is Ostroms opinion that there are two main
open problems regarding the study of public economies. The rst is that (a) we
do not yet understand why some societies are able to solve their collective action
problems and others are not. The second is that (b) we do not yet understand
why societies choose the particular institutions they choose from the vast array of
possible choices. In Ostroms own words: How a group of principals a community
of citizens can organize themselves to solve the problems of institutional supply,
commitment, and monitoring is still a theoretical puzzle. [9, p.29] These are the
questions I set myself to answer in this paper in the context of a simple model of a
public economy.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 I present
some elements of Ostroms research on the study of public economies. In Section 3 I
develop a simple model in which I can investigate the answers to questions (a) and
(b) above. Section 4 concludes.
3
2 Public Economies
In this section I draw from Ostrom [10] and Ostrom and Walker [12], where they
present the main conceptual issues that surround the study of public economies.
Public economies are forms of economic organization composed of collective con-
sumption units of varying sizes that provide services by arranging for their production
and regulating access to, patterns of use, and appropriation of collective goods. [10,
pp. 6-7]
There are two key components to this denition. The rst component acknowl-
edges the need to organize consumption through the creation of collective consump-
tion units. Whenever exclusion is problematic as with public goods and common-
pool resourcescreating a collective consumption unit larger than a household is
essential to overcome problems of free riding and strategic preference revelation, to
determine how costs will be shared among those who benet, to arrange for produc-
tion, and to regulate patterns of access, use, and appropriation. [10, p.7]
The second key component to the denition of a public economy is that the
provision of services is viewed as a distinct process apart from production: The
primary reason for using a form of collective organization is to solve problems of
provision. But once a collective consumption unit is established, how production
is organized is an entirely separate question. [10, p. 7] Therefore, the producers
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in a public economy may or may not be the same organizing unit as the collective
consumption unit that organizes the provision side.
2.1 How to Study a Public Economy (I)
The canonical manner in which modern economists and political scientists study
public economies is by using tools from the theory of non-cooperative games.1 Those
tools have been extremely inuential in spreading the belief that phenomena like the
tragedy of the commonsare the resulting outcome from the process of provision
and appropriation of collective goods in the presence of extremely sparse institutional
structures.
While this exact belief is uncontested by the existing theoretical and empirical
literatures on the topic, considerable disagreement exists regarding the extent to
which individuals are passive recipients of such sparse institutional structures and
the tragedyresults unavoidable. According to Ostrom andWalker [12] these results
are not the necessary outcome in a public economy precisely because individuals act
to transform the rules of interaction into ones in which the tragedycan be avoided.
Kiser and Ostrom [5] distinguish two main levels of rules that cumulatively a¤ect
the actions taken and the outcomes obtained in any setting:
1For a prominent exception see Moulin [8].
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1. Operational rules directly a¤ecting day-to-day decisions made by the partici-
pants in any setting, and
2. Constitutional and collective-choice rules a¤ecting operational activities and
outcomes through their e¤ects in determining who is eligible and the specic
rules to be used in changing operational rules.
Importantly, once one recognizes that those involved in collective action may
shift out of a current gameto a deeper-level game, the necessity of using multiple
levels of analysis becomes apparent. All rules are nested in another set of rules that
if enforced denes how the rst set of rules can be changed. [12, p. 43] (my
italics) Despite this, most of the emphasis in the public choice tradition has been
on predicting behavior within the structure of a game, rather than on the processes
of organizing new games and on self-monitoring and sanctioning activities. [12, p.
45] What is important for the analysis of public economies, however, is to recognize
that individuals can consciously decide to adopt their own rules that either replace
or complement the rules governing an initial collective action situation. [12, p. 43]
2.2 Providing Explanations of the Rules of the Game
The key problem regarding the modern study of public economies is that we know
little about how these rules that govern a collective action situation change over time.
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The point of view maintained by Ostrom and Walker [12] is that, while individual
behavior reacts quickly once the rules that govern the situation are clear, the process
of rule formation is rich in di¢ culties and uncertainties: changes in deeper-level rules
usually are more di¢ cult and more costly to accomplish, thus increasing the stability
of mutual expectations among individuals interacting according to a set of rules.[12,
p. 43] This motivates Ostrom to assert that given these levels of uncertainty about
the basic structure of the problem appropriators face, the only reasonable assumption
to make about the discovery and calculation processes employed [to nd the best
possible rules of the game] is that appropriators engage in a considerable amount
of trial-and-error learning (...) By denition, trial-and-error methods involve errors,
perhaps even disasters. Over time, appropriators gain a more accurate understanding
of the physical world and what to expect from the behavior of others.[9, p.34]2
A very important aspect of Ostroms view on the outcome of such process of
rule formation is that there is no compelling reason to expect necessarily (rst-best)
optimalrules, yet one should expect the resulting institutions to improve over time
whenever the individuals involved have had su¢ cient autonomy to craft their own
institutions. I would like to conclude this very brief exposition of Ostroms theoretical
2That rules of the game change over time in this fashion is of course not an idea that is arcane
to social scientists. To wit: the rules of the game (...) are all akin to equilibrium expectations; the
product of long-term experience by a society of boundedly rational and retrospective individuals.
Kreps [6, pp. 182-3]; it would seem that an appropriate topic of a truly evolutionary game theory
is evolution in the rules of the game.Blume [1, p. 31]
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insights with a quote that neatly summarizes the need for analytical complements
to the received (non-cooperative) theory of collective action:
[Both the experimental evidence and] the evidence from eld settings
show that individuals temporarily caught in a social-dilemma structure
are likely to invest resources to innovate and change the structure itself
in order to improve joint outcomes. They also strengthen the earlier
evidence that the currently accepted, non-cooperative game theoretical
explanation relying on a particular model of the individual does not ad-
equately predict behavior in one-shot and nitely repeated social dilem-
mas. Cooperative game theory does not provide a better explanation.
Since both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory predict extreme
values, neither provides explanations for the conditions that tend to en-
hance or detract from cooperation levels. [11, p. 9]
3 How to Study a Public Economy (II)
In this section I study a public economy in a way that builds on the insights by
Ostrom and her coauthors as spelled out in the previous section. The purpose of this
section is to argue that a mixture of non-cooperative game theory and cooperative
game theory provides an adequate language in which to study two of the main open
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questions in this literature: (i) why some societies are able to solve their collective
action problems and others are not, and (ii) why societies choose the particular
institutions they choose from a vast array of possible choices.
Since I will attempt to show this in the context of a concrete economy I need to
specialize the questions that I want the model to answer. Consider a situation in
which there are two local public goods of di¤erent quality and there is heterogeneity
of abilities of the potential users to prot from those public goods. Assume that the
status quo situation is one of underprovision of the public goods, and that the set of
possible reforms includes one that guarantees a (rst-best) provision. The questions
to ask are :(i)What determines whether this society is able to avoid the situation of
critical underprovision? More concretely, is it more or less likely for the situation of
underprovision to be avoided as the mean ability of the population increases? (ii) If
the situation of underprovision cannot be avoided, what determines which particular
institution is chosen? (iii) Is it at least an `improvementover the status quo?
3.1 The Setup
I focus my attention to a situation in which there are two local public goods, 1 and
2, and a large quantity I of individuals have to choose which of the two goods to
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consume. Individual i0s payo¤ from using good j is given by
U (i; j) = Uj  i   pj;
where i denotes individual i0s ability to prot from consuming either public good
(drawn from the uniform distribution on

; 

; with > 0), Uj represents the quality
of good j and pj denotes the price (if any) that individuals have to pay to have access
to good j. Individuals also have a choice to an outside option (resource 0) valued at
U0i by individual i: I make the following assumptions on the structure of preferences
and on the distribution of abilities:
(A1) U2 > U1 > U0 > 0
(A2) 2+ 
2( ) < (U2 + U1   2U0) < 1
(A3) max
n
1
  ;
1
2 
o
< (U2   U1)
(A4)
3( )(U2 U1)+2
(2 )(U2 U1)+1
(U2 U1)
( )(U2 U1)+1 <
(U2 U1)
(U1 U0) <
3( )(U2 U1)+2
( 2)(U2 U1)+1
(U2 U1)
( )(U2 U1)+1
Assumption A1 reveals the ordering on the quality of the goods. Assumption A2
imposes bounds to the rewards from switching to a higher quality good. Assump-
tion A3 is a lower bound on the rewards from switching to good 2 from good 1.
Assumption A4 says that the rewards from switching to good 2 from good 1 are not
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too distant to rewards from switching to good 1 from the outside option. For this
assumptions to hold simultaneously it is necessary that
 
    > 3 as well, and I
assume this too. Let vj () be the reservation price for good j of an individual with
ability . It is a routine matter to show that
v1 () =  (U1   U0) and
v2 () =  (U2   U0) :
Reservation prices are instrumental in determining the quantity of individuals that
will choose either local public good or their outside option. Let j = j (p1; p2) be
the proportion of individuals that choose good j at prices p1; p2 and j = 0; 1; 2.
Associated with each local public good j there is a producer j who may or may
not be able to charge a price for the good she produces, yet she bears the costs of
producing the good. I assume that the cost of producing good j when used by a
proportion j of I individuals is given by cj
 
j

= I
2
2j : A critical assumption that
I will maintain throughout this analysis is that the only source of revenue that each
producer has comes from the payments, if any, of the individuals that use her good.
In particular, it is not an option for an producer to receive payments from people
not using her good, or from the other producer.
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3.2 The Status Quo Case: Non-excludability
Legal or technological considerations may dictate that no individual can be excluded
from the consumption of his good of choice. I model this situation as one in which
the prices that the producers can e¤ectively impose on the users of the goods are
equal and such that prots vanish.
In this case for each individual i of type  in

; 

we have that U (i; 2) = U2 i >
U (i; 1) = U1  i > U (i; 0) = U0  i: As a consequence, all individuals choose good
2 (s2 = 1; 
s
1 = 
s
0 = 0) and by denition producer 2 obtains prots equal to 0
(therefore, s2 = 
s
1 = 0): This situation with too manyindividuals using resource
2 and too few individuals using resource 1 is the one that I associate with the
well-known tragedyresults from the literature on public goods and common-pool
resources. To make this suboptimality argument precise I now turn to an examination
of the rst-best allocation of this situation.
3.3 The rst-best
As usual, an allocation f of individuals to either local public good or to their
outside options is a (rst-best) e¢ cient allocation whenever f maximizes the sum
of the payo¤s of the individuals (including the producers) given their preferences and
subject to the relevant technological constraints. This amounts to the choice of a
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function f (i) : I ! f0; 1; 2g that assigns every individual i in I to either good 1, 2,
or to the outside option 0. It is not hard to see that, because of the special structure
of this problem, such function can be written as
f (i) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2 if i 2
h
f2 ; 
i
1 if i 2
h
f1 ; 
f
2
i
0 otherwise,
where f1 and 
f
2 solve the problem below
max
1;2
Uo
1   
    I + U1
2   1
    I + U2
   2
    I  
I
2

2   1
   
2
  I
2

   2
   
2
:
Given function f (i) one can compute the proportion fj of individuals that ought
to be assigned to good j according to the rst-best principle. From the rst-order
(necessary and su¢ cient) conditions for the solution of this problem one obtains that
f1 = U1   U0
f2 = U2   U0; and
f0 = 1  (U2 + U1   2U0) ;
all numbers strictly between 0 and 1 because of assumptions A1 and A2. This
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proportions reveal that the status quo situation, that of non-excludability, is indeed
one of underprovision of local public good 1.
It is convenient to dene
FB () =
X
i2I
Uf (i)  i  
I
2

f1
2
  I
2

f2
2
as the maximized value of this rst-best problem given the prole  of abilities
and FB i() as the maximized value of individuals other than i from an e¢ cient
allocation when the prole of abilities is given by :
3.4 Envisioning Reform
The producers of the local public goods are not doing so well in the status quo
regime: producers 1 and 2 are getting zero prots. Rather than playing the status quo
game, the producers face the challenge of collectively choosing an alternative game
in which they could fare better. To illustrate how this process of collective choice
may be studied I endow the producers (and only the producers) with opportunities
for choosing which game to play out of a small set that contains the status quo game.
Before I continue with the explanation of how the process of game selection takes
place let me introduce the set of games out of which the players will collectively
choose.
14
3.5 The First Reform: Excludability Through Prices
In the institutional setup corresponding to the rst reform both producers are able to
transform the legal and technological barriers that prevented them from e¤ectively
discriminating among types of users in the status quo game. The new rules are such
that each producer chooses prices independently, however. As this is very important
for the analysis let me stress it here: it is not feasible for them to choose prices
jointly. As before, it is also not feasible for the producers to transfer prots among
themselves.
An analysis of a situation formally similar to the one depicted here has been
performed by Gabszewicz and Thisse [2] for the case of zero costs in the context
of oligopolistic competition. Their method of analysis can be used to compute the
proportion of individuals that will use either local public good and the outside option
given positive prices. In what follows I will be interested in prices that support a pos-
itive proportion of individuals selecting both goods, and no proportion of individuals
selecting the outside option. Let e be such that
v2(
e)  p2 = v1(e)  p1;
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and consider the conjecture, subject to verication, that
p2 > v1 () > p1
By construction, given prices p1 and p2 all individuals with abilities in the interval
[; e] will choose good 1 and all individuals with abilities in the interval

e; 

will
choose good 2. Therefore, the proportions of individuals that will use each good in
this scenario as a function of prices are given by
1 (p1; p2) =
p2   p1
(U2   U1)
 
         
2 (p1; p2) = 1 
p2   p1
(U2   U1)
 
    +     ; and
0 (p1; p2) = 0:
The proof of this fact is virtually identical to the proof of Lemma 2 in Gabszewicz
and Thisse [2] and I therefore omit it here.
With this information about the proportion of individuals that will select good
1, the problem of each producer j is to select the price pej that maximizes her prots,
when taking the price pe j chosen by the other producer as given. Therefore, p
e
1 and
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pe2 are a solution to
max
p1
p1  e1 (p1; pe2) I  
I
2
e1 (p1; p
e
2)
2 and
max
p2
p2  e2 (pe1; p2) I  
I
2
e1 (p
e
1; p2)
2 :
From the strict concavity of the objective functions of the producers it follows
that their best-response functions are unique and given by
p1 =
1  a
b
1 + b
2 + b
+
1 + b
2 + b
p2 and
p2 =
a
b
1 + b
2 + b
+
1 + b
2 + b
p1;
where b = 1
( )(U2 U1) < 1 and 1 < a =

  < (2 + b) (by assumptions A1   A2):
This pair of equations for the prices have a unique solution pe1 and p
e
2 given by
pe1 =
1 + b
b
2 + b  a
3 + 2b
and
pe2 =
1 + b
b
a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b
:
Notice that both prices are strictly positive and that pe2 > v1 () > p
e
1; as conjectured.
A proof of this can be found in the Appendix.
With this in hand one can compute the proportion of individuals that will select
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each good in equilibrium
e1 =
2 + b  a
3 + 2b
;
e2 =
a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b
; and
e0 = 0:
and the prots that both producers collect:
e1 =
2 + b
2b

2 + b  a
3 + 2b
2
I; and
e2 =
2 + b
2b

a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b
2
I:
This is, therefore, what the producers can expect to obtain if this is the game that
they choose to play.
3.6 The Second Reform: Implementing the First-Best Out-
come
The second reform that I will allow in the set of possible reforms is an institutional
setup that requires the producers to implement the e¢ cient (rst-best) outcome de-
scribed earlier. This implementation is naturally not a trivial matter because the
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producers of the goods neither have the information about the abilities of the in-
dividuals in the economy nor can they force the individuals to participate in the
institution they design to elicit an e¢ cient consumption of the goods. As a conse-
quence, inducing them through appropriate compensation to reveal the information
necessary for the implementation of the e¢ cient outcome can be so costly to the
producers that it may make it undesirable, from their point of view, to implement it
at all. The point, therefore, of allowing the producers the option to bond themselves
to an e¢ cient production of the public goods is to see whether they would, jointly
and voluntarily, take this option in a situation of cooperative bargaining.
The setup is, to be sure, one in which each producer is required to select a
method for inducing a (rst-best) e¢ cient consumption of the public good under
her administration. The method may or may not involve communication of any
kind between any of the participants in the economy and may or may not involve
compensation contingent on the content of such communication. In this scenario
for reform, each producer has the ability to arbitrarily exclude any individual from
employing the public good under her administration, yet each producer is not allowed
to accept compensation neither from the other producer nor from individuals using
the good that is not under her administration.
It turns out that there is an easy way to characterize what would happen in such
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a situation. It is a dominant strategy for each producer to use the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism (among the class of e¢ cient mechanisms). This is because
of a result by Krishna and Perry [7] according to which this mechanism maximizes
the payments collected from each individual participating in the mechanism among
the class of (rst-best) e¢ cient mechanisms.
I will go over the construction of this mechanism briey following the approach
in Krishna and Perry [7]. The V CG mechanism with basis ; denoted by
 
f ; pv

; is
dened as one in which each individual i is invited to give a report ri of his abilities,
is assigned to a public good and charged a price for the employment of this public
good that is contingent on the report. The payments required from each individual
willing to participate in the mechanism are given by
pv (r;i) = [FB (; r i)  FB i (r)]  U0  ;
where FB (; r i) is the (maximized) value of the rst-best problem given the prole
(; r i) of abilities and FB i(r) as the (maximized) value of individuals other than i
from an e¢ cient allocation when the prole of abilities is given by r: Notice that the
rst best rule f assigns an individual with ability  to his outside option. Therefore,
an individual i with ability  is the most reluctanttype of agent i in the sense that
his gain from participating in the V GG mechanism is the least among all the types
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of i. As a consequence, the payment rule for individual i can be written as
pv (r;i) = [U0   + FB i (; r i)  FB i (r)]  U0   = FB i (; r i)  FB i (r) ;
The amount pv (r;i) represents the externality that i exerts on the rest of the
economy by being of ability ri rather than . It is the di¤erence between the welfare
of others without himand the welfare of others with him.For the problem at
hand the payment rule is
pv (r;i) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pv2 = 
f
1 (U1   U0) + f2 (U2   U1) if ri 2
h
f2 ; 
i
pv1 = 
f
1 (U1   U0) if ri 2
h
f1 ; 
f
2
i
pv0 = 0 otherwise.
It is not hard to see that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in this mecha-
nism and thus it is also incentive compatible. The proof of this is in the Appendix.
The prots that each producer gets from using a pricing scheme as in this mechanism
are given by
v1 = p
v
1
f
1I  
I
2

f1
2
; and
v2 = p
v
2
f
2I  
I
2

f2
2
;
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or
v1 =

f1  
1
2

(U1   U0)2 I; and
v2 =

f1  
1
2

+
 
    (U2   U1) (U2   U0)2 I:
3.7 The Grand Game: A mixture of cooperative and non-
cooperative behavior
The existence of a status quo situation (non-excludability) coupled with the reforms
described above (excludability and rst-best reform) I study as a situation in
which in the rst stage the players cooperatively choose, according to Nashs rules
of axiomatic bargaining,3 which game to play, while in the second stage they play
a Nash equilibrium of the chosen game. I call this the Nash-Nash solution of the
public economy problem. Formally, Gs is the status quo game described above, and
Ge and Gv stand for the excludability case and the rst-best reform, respectively.
The Nash-Nash solution of the public economy problem under study then requires
the application of the Nash bargaining solution over the Nash equilibrium payo¤s of
the games Gs, Ge and Gv, with the disagreement payo¤s given by the equilibrium
3A justication for the application of Nashs bargaining solution in this setting can be found in
Kaneko [4].
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payo¤s of the status quo game Gs.
3.7.1 Analysis
As there is not a straightforward manner of comparing the products v1 (
v
2   s2)
and e1 (
e
2   s2) for computing this solution in general I consider evaluating those
products along the curves (v1 (m) ; 
v
2 (m)) and (
e
1 (m) ; 
e
2 (m)) as the mean m of
distribution of abilities (keeping the variance constant) varies in the interval [m;m] ;
where m and m must satisfy
 
3
2
+ b
  
     m >m 3
2
because of A1   A4. It
turns out that for m close enough to m v1 (m) is negative, so that producer 1 will
always reject any proposal to select game Gv because she does better in the status
quo game Gs; where she obtains zero prots. Interestingly, the product v1 (
v
2   s2)
is strictly increasing in m and the product e1 (
e
2   s2) is strictly decreasing in m.
Indeed, as m approaches m; prots e1 (m) approach zero and therefore the product
e1 (
e
2   s2) approaches zero as well. Therefore, there is a mean income m such
that if m > m the Nash-Nash solution of the public economy problem picks game
Gv and if m < m the Nash-Nash solution picks game Ge. The details are worked
out in Appendix 2.
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3.8 Discussion
With this in hand I am ready to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this
section: (i) the situation of critical underprovision can arise if the revenue raised by
producer 1 in game Gv is too small so that it would force producer 1 to run a decit
in order to induce an e¢ cient consumption of good 1. This will happen if the mean
ability of the potential users of the goods is su¢ ciently low. Therefore, the situation
of underprovision of the best good is more likely to be avoided as the mean ability
of the population increases.
(ii) This is not to say that the rst-best e¢ cient outcome will be selected as soon
as producer 1 ceases to run a decit. This is because the prots that she obtains in
the excludability case may still be much higher than those she obtains in the e¢ cient
allocation game. Interestingly, as the mean ability increases there are two e¤ects that
weaken the appeal of the excludability case in favor of the rst-best game.
First, that the prots of both producers are increasing in mean abilities in the
rst-best situation. This is so because the rst-best allocation, and therefore costs,
do not depend on the mean ability, but willingness to pay for the consumption of
the goods increases uniformly across individuals with the mean ability. This simply
means more revenues for the producers with no added costs. Second, that the prots
of producer 2 are increasing in mean ability but the prots of producer 1 actually
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decrease with mean ability in the excludability case. This is so because, with an
increase in mean ability, every individuals valuation of both public goods increases,
but the valuation of the best good increases relatively more than that of the worst
good. This increase in relative valuation leads to an increase in both the price charged
by producer 2 and the proportion of individuals using good 2. The combination of this
two e¤ects jointly explain how changes in m a¤ect which non-cooperative game will
be selected cooperatively as the Nash-Nash solution of the public economy problem.
(iii) The excludability case does not yield a rst-best allocation of individuals to
all goods, but it yields a smaller underprovision of the best good. This is no proof
of the normative superiority of this outcome relative to the status quo situation,
however, because everybody in this economy, except for the producers, is worse o¤ at
either reform when we compare their payo¤s to those which obtain in the status quo
situation. This is a crude reminder of the fact that, when the opportunities
for redistribution are severely restricted, there is no reason to believe that
an increase in e¢ ciency has anything to say about the overall welfare of
society.
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4 Conclusions
When applied to concrete economic problems the model developed to formalize Os-
troms theories of public economies helps support conclusions such as the following:
(i) A rst bestreform need not be selected as the Nash-Nash solution of a public
economy problem even if it arises as an equilibrium of one of the possible games to
be played, and (ii) A rst bestreform may be chosen as the Nash-Nash solution of
a public economy problem yet the choice may force some players (with no bargaining
power) to payo¤s that are dominated by those they could have obtained in the status
quo game. These results are in line with an old and sometimes forgotten principle
from the public economics literature: that when opportunities for redistributing pay-
o¤s among the players are severely restricted, a rst bestreform may neither be
predictively accurate nor normatively desirable. That this principle is overlooked so
frequently in the analysis of public policies has recently motivated the work of many
authors, including Hammond [3], Ray and Vohra [13] and Moulin [8].
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof that 0 < pe1 < v1() < p
e
2 in the rst reform
The price pej that producer j charges to users of good j in a non-cooperative price
competition scenario is given, in equilibrium, by
pe1 =
1 + b
b
2 + b  a
3 + 2b
and
pe2 =
1 + b
b
a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b
:
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Clearly, pe2 > 0: Price p
e
1 is also positive because A1  A3 guarantee that a < 2 + b.
I now check that pe1 < v1() < p
e
2: From assumption A4 we have that
3 + 2b
a+ 1 + b
a  1
1 + b
<
(U2   U1)
(U1   U0) <
3 + 2b
2 + b  a
a  1
1 + b
:
Rearranging this expression one obtains
3 + 2b
a+ 1 + b
b
1 + b
<
1
(U1   U0)  <
3 + 2b
2 + b  a
b
1 + b
;
which can be written as
(1 + b)
b

2 + b  a
3 + 2b

= pe1 <  (U1   U0) = v1() <
(1 + b)
b

a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b

= pe2;
and that is what we wanted to show.
29
5.2 Proof that participating and truth-telling is a weakly
dominant strategy for the individuals in the second re-
form
For the problem at hand the payment rule is
pvi (r) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
f1 (U1   U0) + f2 (U2   U1) if ri 2
h
f2 ; 
i
f1 (U1   U0) if ri 2
h
f1 ; 
f
2
i
0 otherwise,
Consider an individual i with ability i 2
h
; f1
i
: If the individual reports his true
ability he gets to pay nothing, is assigned to good 0 and ends up with a payo¤
equal to U0  i > 0: If the individual reports any other ability in the interval
h
; f1
i
he gets exactly the same payo¤ as before, so he has no incentives to deviate to
any such report. If the individual reports an ability in the interval

f1 ; 
f
2
i
he is
assigned to good 1; pays a price equal to f1 (U1   U0) and gets a payo¤ equal to
U1  i   f1 (U1   U0) = U1

i   f1

+ f1 (U0) : This payo¤ is smaller than that
obtained by reporting her true type, however, since U1

i   f1

+ f1 U0 U0  i =
(U1   U0)

i   f1

< 0: If the individual reports an ability in the interval

f2 ; 
i
he is assigned to good 2, pays a price equal to f1 (U1   U0) + f2 (U2   U1) and gets
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a payo¤ equal to U2  i   f1 (U1   U0)   f2 (U2   U1) : The di¤erence between this
payo¤ and the payo¤ that obtains from reporting an ability in the interval

f1 ; 
f
2
i
is given by
U1  i   f1 (U1   U0)  f2 (U2   U1)  U1

i   f1

  f1 (U0) ;
which can be written as (U2   U1)

i   f2

< 0: Therefore, reporting an ability in
the interval

f2 ; 
i
is a dominated strategy. From all this, it follows that truth-telling
is a weakly dominant strategy. Also, since the individual gets as payo¤ of at least
the value of her outside option, then the participation constraint is also met.
The arguments for individuals with abilities in the intervals

f1 ; 
f
2
i
and

f2 ; 
i
to show that truth-telling is a dominant strategy are analogous to the one just given
and I omit them here.
5.3 Details on the e¤ect of changes in mean ability m on the
Nash-Nash solution of the public economy problem
Since the mean ability m is dened as

+
2

the terms  and  can be dened as
 = m + 1
2
 
   , a = m
( ) +
1
2
and f1 = m +
 
    1
2
  (U1 + U2   2U0)

for
xed
 
    : In what follows all functions of m are assumed to have domain equal
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to [m;m] : We can therefore compute the expressions
@e1
@m
=  2 + b
b

2 + b  a
3 + 2b

I
 
1 
    (3 + 2b)
!
< 0;
@e2
@m
=
2 + b
b

a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b

I
 
1 
    (3 + 2b)
!
> 0
and
@v1
@m
= (U1   U0)2 I > 0
@v2
@m
= (U2   U0)2 I > 0:
Notice that the product e1
e
2 is continuous and strictly decreasing in m
@e1
e
2
@m
=
@e1
@m
e2 +
@e2
@m
e1
=  
(
2 + b
b

2 + b  a
3 + 2b

I
 
1 
    (3 + 2b)
!"
2 + b
2b

a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b
2
I
#)
+
(
2 + b
b

a+ 1 + b
3 + 2b

I
 
1 
    (3 + 2b)
!
2 + b
2b

2 + b  a
3 + 2b
2
I
)
=
"
(2 + b)2
2b2
(a+ 1 + b) (2 + b  a)
(3 + 2b)4
I2 
   
#
[+]
[1  2a]
[ ]
+
@e1
@m
[ ]
< 0
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and that the product v1 (
v
2   s2) is continuous and strictly increasing in m
@v1
v
2
@m
=
@v1
@m
[+]
v2 +
@v2
@m
[+]
v1 > 0
Now evaluate the function d(m) = e1
e
2 v1v2: It is continuous and strictly decreas-
ing. Moreover, this function is such that, for m close enough to m, d(m) > 0 and for
m close enough to m; d(m) < 0: Then, by the intermediate value theorem, there is a
unique m such that if m < m then e1
e
2 > 
v
1
v
2 and if m > m
 then e1
e
2 < 
v
1
v
2;
that is, the Nash-Nash solution of the public economy problem selects game Ge if
m < m and game Gv if m > m.
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